We test whether women's representation benefited from the left's dominance in Latin America during the "pink tide". We find that left governments did not strengthen quota laws more than right governments. Further, after controlling for confounding factors, we find that left parties did not nominate or elect more women. Rather, we find the decision environment shapes parties' choices about women candidates: when citizens distrust political parties, parties nominate more women, but when citizens evaluate the economy poorly, and when parties face many challengers, they nominate more men. Thus, the decision environments in which parties operate overshadow the effects of ideology.
Introduction
Conventional wisdom holds that political parties on the ideological left, because of their emphasis on equality and egalitarianism, will nominate and elect more women. In Latin America, the "pink tide"-a surge of leftist governments that assumed power in twelve of the eighteen countries beginning with Venezuela's Hugo Chávez in 1999-sparked a region-wide transformation. Even countries that never elected left governments felt the pull, as left parties proved formidable challengers in countries even where the right ultimately won. Scholars examining the impact of the pink tide on gender equality have largely focused on left presidents' promulgation-or not-of feminist policies, such as abortion liberalization (Blofield, Ewig and Piscopo 2017, this volume; Kampwirth 2008) . How Latin America's left turn has affected women's access to decision-making power has received less attention. Using an original dataset to examine the nomination and election of women to legislative office at the party-level during Latin America's pink tide, we ask whether women's political representation benefited from the left's dominance in the region.
National-level figures suggest that the new millennium brought about large gains for women's political representation in Latin America: their share of legislative seats in the region's unicameral or lower chambers rose from under 10 percent in 2000 to nearly 27 percent in 2016, and women won the presidency in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Brazil.
1 Did the left's surge cause these gains? Scholars explaining these trends in legislatures have largely overlooked the role of political parties, focusing instead on gender quota laws. Quota laws-measures requiring parties to nominate a specified percentage of female candidates-have played a pivotal role in increasing women's legislative representation (Alles 2014; Jones 2009; Schwindt-Bayer 2009) . Both left and right governments have adopted and strengthened quota laws, but the left could still matter at the party level: quotas are floors rather than ceilings, and parties still decide how many and which candidacies they distribute to women. If left parties support women more than right parties (Duverger 1955; Kittilson 2006; Matland 1993) , then even in quota contexts, left parties should more enthusiastically promote women's inclusion and representation.
At the same time, the left shift was not uniform across Latin America, and its recent unraveling may have gendered consequences. The left has retained power since 1999 only in Uruguay and Venezuela. In other countries, such as Mexico, right or centrist governments have remained in power despite a strong leftist challenger (Andrés Manuel Ló pez Obrador in 2006), and others, such as Chile, have alternated between left and right (the left's loss to Sebastián Piñera in 2010). Starting in the late 2000s, the strength or endurance of the left appears in doubt across the region. The latter-half of the pink tide coincided with a protracted "crisis of representation" (Mainwaring 2006) . Citizens' dissatisfaction with the economy increased and their trust in parties plummeted. Many traditional party systems collapsed, leading to the emergence of new parties and splinter parties. These changes to parties' decision environments have gendered implications. On the one hand, parties may view female candidates as signaling renewal or change (Funk 2015; Morgan and Buice 2013) , so parties losing public trust might promote more women than they would otherwise. On the other hand, parties strongly prefer the status quo-which means male candidates (Bjarnegård 2013 )-and gender stereotypes construct the economy as a male policy domain (Dolan 2010; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993) .
The pink tide therefore could prove either advantageous or disadvantageous to women's representation. Our paper constitutes the first effort to understand how this period shaped the nomination and election of women at the party level. We ask whether ideology matters in relation to the institutional factors commonly assumed to drive women's political representation, including national-level quota laws, and in relation to decision environment factors, including citizens' trust in parties, evaluations of economic performance, and the number of competitor parties. The gendered dimensions of the decision environment in particular have received little scholarly attention. To complete the analysis, we build an original dataset that combines two waves of the Inter-American Development Bank's project on Gender and Political Parties in Latin America (GEPPAL, according to its Spanish acronym) with country-and party-level measures of institutions and the decision environments in which parties operate. Our dataset offers a complete picture of party-level trends in the nomination and election of women to both lower and upper chambers.
Overall, we find little reason to believe that the left particularly advantages women's political representation in Latin America. The pink tide, and thus left parties in government, cannot explain the strengthening of quota laws. In terms of nominations and elections, left parties only promote slightly more women relative to the right for the lower or unicameral house-but in our multivariate analysis, which examines the influence of institutional, party, and decision environment factors, the significance of party ideology disappears entirely. 2 The full model shows that national quota laws positively affect women's nomination and election, and, most importantly, that the decision environment shapes parties' choices about women candidates. When voters distrust parties, women's nominations increase, but when voters are unhappy with the economy and when parties face many competitors, women's nominations decrease. In other words, parties facing situations of low trust will choose women, perhaps to signal political renewal, whereas parties facing poor ratings of the economy or those expecting to face many challengers will choose men, perhaps to signal stability. Women's nominations to lower houses also decrease the longer leftist presidents are in power. Our findings thus nuance the conventional wisdom: the decision environment has gendered effects, and these effects matter more than party ideology for predicting women's access to the legislature.
We begin by discussing how institutions, parties, and the electoral environment shape women's access to Latin American legislatures. We then present our theoretical expectations based on the prior literature. Finally, we present three sets of analyses. We first consider whether left parties in government strengthened national quota laws and second whether left parties promote women more than non-left parties, even after controlling for the different quota regimes under which parties operate. Third, we present our full models to analyze how institutional, party, and decision environment variables together influence women's nomination and election. We conclude by reflecting on the importance of the decision environment for women's access to power.
Explaining Women's Political Representation in Latin America
The pink tide not only brought left governments to power and invigorated leftist parties throughout the region, it also installed significant expectations of social and political change, among these, the incorporation of previously marginalized groups such as women (Friedman 2009 ). Most scholarship on women's access to legislative power in Latin America has focused not on political parties, but on electoral institutions, and especially national gender quota laws. Yet given their fundamental role in selecting candidates, parties are ultimately responsible for women's political incorporation. Further, parties make strategic decisions about candidacies based not just on their ideology, but also on the salient issues and nature of the competition in a given election (what we call "the decision environment").
Institutional Factors
Researchers have determined that electoral systems have gendered effects: proportional representation (rather than plurality) rules and greater district magnitude (size) yield more female office-holders (Duverger 1955; Matland 1993) . Parties fielding candidates in multi-member districts have more incentives to diversify their candidate slates and thus capture votes from a broader cross-section of the electorate: even if these less traditional candidates (i.e., women) are placed in the symbolic, lower-ranked positions, they still receive nominations (Jones 1996) . Closed-list proportional representation (CLPR), especially combined with high district magnitude, allows party leaders to be magnanimous. By contrast, open-list systems (where voters cast preference votes for individual candidates) favor men (Jones and Navia 1999). 3 Additionally, gender quota laws matter enormously for raising women's legislative representation. In 1991, Argentina made history as the world's first country to adopt a mandatory 30 percent quota for legislative candidacies. Quotas quickly gained popularity as the "fast track" approach to improving women's representation, especially in developing democracies eager to display their gender equality credentials (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005) . As of January 2017, all Latin American countries-save Guatemala and Venezuela-had adopted or implemented national-level quota laws. Quota laws were less common and less strong during the pink tide, however (Piscopo 2016a ). Yet during this earlier era as well as today, scholars conclude that quota laws-especially when operating in CLPR-remain the best predictor of women's election (Alles 2014; Jones 2009; Schwindt-Bayer 2009 Political parties are the vehicles through which citizens obtain representation within democratic systems. Parties also act as gatekeepers, controlling access to positions of power within the state. Understanding how parties create opportunities for women, a social group historically excluded from political power, provides a crucial test for the quality of democratic politics (Morgan and Hinojosa 2018) .
Traditionally, ideology has shaped parties' willingness to include women: "Leftist parties, because of an emphasis on egalitarianism, would be more inclusive of women whereas parties of the Right, because of their more conservative ideas about women's public and private roles, would be less likely to place women on their party lists" (Hinojosa 2009, 378) . Strong linkages between left parties and women's movements, as well as the left's continued push for the inclusion of previously marginalized groups, has buttressed the view that left parties are more likely to nominate and elect women than nonleft parties. Most cross-national studies from Latin America do find a positive relationship between parties' left ideology and the election of women (Alles 2014; Jones, Alles, and Tchintian 2012; but see Roza 2010) .
Debate emerges especially when studies use smaller samples, including single-case studies. In some countries, left parties do seem more supportive of women's inclusion. Left parties in Mexico, for instance, took the lead on adopting internal party quotas and over-filling national quotas (Bruhn 2003; Piscopo 2016b) . In Central America, by contrast, left parties outside of Nicaragua do not elect more women than right parties (Saint-Germain and Chavez Metoyer 2008). Women's legislative representation rose dramatically under the pink tide government of Evo Morales (Bolivia), but not during the left presidencies of Hugo Chávez (Venezuela), Michelle Bachelet (Chile), or Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva (Brazil) (Friedman 2009 ). In Chile, left parties may nominate more women to legislative seats, but parties on the right elect more women (Bo and Navia 2016) .
These studies signal the importance of separating candidates from those elected (Roza 2010, 213) . Women must first become candidates in order to be elected, and they face hurdles even in the candidate selection phase, including gender stereotypes that deem them less competitive and less qualified (Dolan 2010; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993) ; a preference for incumbents, who are overwhelmingly male (Schwindt-Bayer 2005) ; unequal access to powerful positions within parties (Franceschet and Piscopo 2014) ; and recruitment practices that routinely overlook female talent (Hinojosa 2012) . Even so, granting women access to ballots may itself be insufficient: parties also influence who on the ballot actually wins, because they decide the ranking of candidates and which candidates they field in which districts.
Broadly, parties of all ideologies remain dominated by men. Scholars have characterized parties as old boys' clubs: organizations built on producing and reproducing men's homosocial capital. These practices structure the "rules of the game" such that men preserve their power and women are deliberately excluded (Bjarnegård 2013) . For instance, Brazilian parties of the left and right routinely discriminate against women when distributing the financial resources necessary for successful political campaigns (Wylie and dos Santos 2016) . In Bolivia, Morales's Movement Toward Socialism party holds indigenous inclusion and gender parity among its organizing principles, but pervasive patriarchal values pose significant barriers for women's advancementincluding outright hostility and even violence toward female candidates (Restrepo Sanín 2016) . Overall, Latin American parties on the left and right have done little to broadly incorporate women. Women's policy concerns are largely missing from party platforms; parties rarely adopt feminist positions on policy debates surrounding women's issues; and parties mostly fail to create organizational ties with women's groups (Morgan and Hinojosa 2018) .
Parties' Decision Environments
During the era of the pink tide, left parties grew in power and popularity throughout Latin America. If left parties are more conducive to women's representation, as the conventional wisdom suggests, then we would expect women's nominations and elections to increase as the left gains greater control over government. However, the pink tide might also be indicative of changing regional norms about inclusion and equality, suggesting that we should see women's representation rise in parties of all ideologies, not just in left parties. Right parties may not agree with the left's normative goals, but may feel compelled to promote more women in order to remain electorally viable. We therefore expect that both parties of the left and right will be more likely to nominate and elect women as the pink tide endures (Hypothesis 1).
Parties may also incorporate women in response to citizen optimism or distrust. Left governments came to power in the region as improving economic conditions led citizens to support left actors, who were largely statist, nationalist, and redistributive (Remmer 2012) . Many left presidents indeed enjoyed periods of prolonged popularity, buoyed by a commodities boom that allowed them to invest heavily in social spending without introducing austerity measures (Levitsky and Roberts 2011 ). Yet these good times were not to last, as the latter-half of the pink tide has been characterized by economic downturns and political crises. Though scholars began documenting rising citizen dissatisfaction with traditional political institutions in the late 1990s (Domínguez 1997) , the term "crisis of representation" has enjoyed renewed popularity to describe the fragmentation and collapse of Latin America's political parties and party systems throughout the 2000s (Hochstetler and Friedman 2012; Mainwaring 2006) .
Shifting public opinion on institutional trust and economic performance has gendered implications. Women's historic exclusion from formal politics, combined with stereotypes that portray women as more trustworthy and honest, may make women attractive candidates when citizen anger is high (Morgan and Buice 2013) . Parties may promote women to signal to voters that the party has changed and deserves their vote. Thus, we expect parties to nominate and elect more women when citizens are skeptical of parties (Hypothesis 2).
How citizens evaluate the economy may also shape women's political opportunities. Economic performance shapes not only voters' decisions (Powell and Whitten 1993) , but also parties' election strategies (Williams, Seki, and Whitten 2016) . In difficult economic times, parties may hesitate to promote women candidates because economics traditionally has been viewed as a male domain. Presidents infrequently appoint women to "masculine" cabinet posts, including economics (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2016), and women are underrepresented on budget and finance committees in congress (Schwindt-Bayer 2010). Female legislators are also less likely to hold economics degrees than male legislators (Franceschet and Piscopo 2014) . Thus, party leaders may view men as better economic managers and may promote more men when citizens view the economy unfavorably. We expect parties of all ideologies to nominate and elect fewer women as perceptions of the economy worsen (Hypothesis 3).
Shifts in the party system may also have gendered effects. The fragmentation of traditional parties into separate competitors and the entrance of new parties mean that more parties divide the electoral spoils. As each party wins fewer votes and fewer seats, the total number of candidacies, and ultimately seats, available to women within each party decreases. The short supply of candidacies and seats will especially disadvantage women, who are less likely to be party leaders or incumbents (both of whom often get priority). Conversely, when the party system is less fragmented and parties face fewer competitors, women are more likely to be nominated and elected (Reynolds 1999) . We expect parties to nominate and elect fewer women when they face many viable competitors and anticipate winning fewer seats (Hypothesis 4).
Below, we present results from three sets of analyses. First, we use the timing of national quota laws' adoption and strengthening to assess whether the pink tide improved women's representation via national-level institutional reform. If left governments, as part of their broader commitments to fairness and equality, are largely responsible for the advancement of quotas, then the effect of left parties might be underestimated in any quantitative analyses that control for both party ideology and quotas, because quotas would "take from" ideology's explanatory power. In other words, left parties could have an indirect effect on women's nominations and elections through having adopted stronger quota laws. Second, we explore whether left parties promote more women within the party, and whether left parties are more likely than non-left parties to nominate and elect women, even when controlling for different quota regimes. Third and finally, we introduce our multivariate models that examine whether party ideology continues to affect women's nomination and election even after controlling for institutions and the decision environments in which parties operate. We argue that analyses that consider party-or institutional-level variables alone are incomplete in explaining women's nominations and elections. The decision environment plays a vital role in shaping women's political representation.
Are Left Parties Responsible for the Advancement of Quota Laws?
Before presenting the results of our quantitative analyses, we first discuss the role of left governments in quota adoption and reform. Analyses based on today's quota laws highlight their importance throughout Latin America (Schwindt-Bayer 2015) . Yet in the early and mid-2000s, quota laws were less common and weaker. For instance, Bolivia and Ecuador had yet to increase their quotas' threshold to 50 percent (known as gender parity), and Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, and Uruguay had no quota laws. Quota strength also varied considerably, given weak enforcement mechanisms and parties' abilities to exploit loopholes or comply minimally; for example, parties would cluster women at the bottom of their electoral lists (Piscopo 2016a, b) . The pink tide saw quotas become stronger and more widespread, raising the question of whether left parties in government affect women's representation through the promotion of quota laws.
If left parties matter through their effect on national laws rather than party-level decisions, then any positive effects of quotas on women's nominations and elections may be attributed to left parties in government. Thus, our multivariate model controlling for quotas would underestimate the overall effect of the left. To determine whether the left was responsible for quota advancement during the pink tide, we compare the timing of quota adoption and reform to the ascendancy of left governments. Table 1 shows the left presidents that characterized the pink tide, beginning with Chávez's election in 1998.
Most Latin American countries adopted their initial quota laws prior to these presidents taking office. Argentina adopted Latin America's-and the world's-first quota law in 1991. Twelve more countries adopted nationallevel quotas before 1999. Of these early adopters, ten (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru) had their quotas in place when the pink tide began, and two did not (as Colombia and Venezuela quickly repealed their quotas).
Looking within the pink tide from 1999 to the mid-2010s, we discern two distinct patterns. First, the strengthening of quotas during this period-the adoption, modification, and enforcement of quota laws-occurred under both left and right parties in government. Nine of the ten countries that began the pink tide with quotas in place revised their quotas at least once during this period, some multiple times. In six cases (Argentina, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, and Peru), a pink tide president did not preside over the reform(s). In fact, quota reforms were often prompted by high court rulings, so governments acted not out of goodwill, but because the judicial branch forced their hand (Piscopo 2015) . Only in two cases-the first and only reform in Bolivia and the second reform in Ecuador-did quota strengthening appear unequivocally linked to pink tide governments. Pink tide presidents Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador made broad commitments to inclusion and equality, which included adopting new constitutions that established gender parity in all branches and levels of government (Htun and Ossa 2013; IDEA 2013) .
Second, not all pink tide governments installed quotas where they were absent. Of the eight countries that began the pink tide without quota laws, six adopted quotas during this period: Honduras and Colombia under right parties, and Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay under left parties. Nonetheless, parity government constituted an agenda item that only the left presidents Morales and Correa acted upon immediately. Chile's Bachelet supported gender quotas (Thomas 2016) , but the law did not pass until her second term, as part of the 2015 electoral reforms. Quota laws were not central to the policy agendas of Funes in El Salvador, Ortega in Nicaragua, or Vázquez in Uruguay, as evidenced by their passage in the twilight of each president's administration. Venezuela's failure to adopt quotas is particularly striking: Chávez positioned himself as "righting the wrongs" of gender inequality (Espina and Rowkowski 2010, 193) and his party's control over the legislative assembly and the Supreme Court gave him considerable policy In sum, quota strengthening during the pink tide occurred under left and right governments. This pattern persists even when looking just at the region's female presidents: neither centrist Laura Chinchilla nor leftists Cristina Fernández and Dilma Rousseff presided over quota reforms, and leftist Bachelet initially failed to pass Chile's first quota law. We are therefore confident that the effects of left parties on women's nominations and elections are not operating solely through left governments' passage of quota laws. For each Latin American country, table 2 shows the timing of quota laws' initial adoption, the start of the pink tide, the elections in our dataset, and an assigned quota strength score for both lower and upper houses that corresponds to these elections. This score allows us to control for quota laws' effects in our multivariate analysis. The score ranges from 0 to 4, with a country receiving one point for each of the following: the presence of a quota law, a threshold of 40 percent or higher, a placement mandate for women on electoral lists, and the presence of enforcement mechanisms. Bolivia and Mexico appear twice because their scores changed during our period of study.
Do Left Parties Promote Women within the Party and for Legislative Office?
Although we find no systematic relationship between left parties in government and the advancement of national quota laws, left parties can influence women's representation within their own organizations. Left parties are expected to surpass right parties in several ways. First, they may adopt internal quotas, which are often called "voluntary party quotas" because compliance depends not on external regulatory bodies, such as electoral commissions or courts, but on the parties' own leadership. Party quotas have proved instrumental in increasing women's parliamentary representation in Europe To explore the relationship between ideology and parties' promotion of women, we construct an original panel dataset, using the GEPPAL data as its core. For all parties obtaining a minimum of 5 percent representation in the lower chamber, GEPPAL provides data on their internal efforts to promote women, including initiatives to make parties "women-friendly" as well as their nomination and election of women. The data are based on surveys of country 4 Several parties appear once not because many data are missing, but because Latin America's "crisis of representation" means that traditional parties have fragmented and reconstituted under different names, and that new players have entered the arena.
5 Additionally, we have fewer observations for the upper house, as only nine countries have senates. The unit of analysis is the party-country-election year. In other words, each Gender, Political Parties, and Latin America's Pink Tide observation corresponds to one party in a given country in a given year. (See  Supplementary table S1 .) The GEPPAL data allow us to derive a latent measure of each party's level of women-friendliness by conducting a factor analysis of three indicators: whether the party has a quota, whether the party president or secretary is a woman, and whether the party's statute mentions gender equality. All three variables load positively onto a single factor, with individual factor loading scores between 0.44 and 0.81 (Eigenvalue ¼ 1.49). The final variable is continuous, with larger values indicating greater women-friendliness. We measure party ideology using Baker and Greene's Latin American Legislative Election Results with Party Ideology Scores.
6 The ideology score ranges from 1 to 20, where 1 equals extreme left and 20 equals extreme right. To determine whether left parties are more "women friendly" and nominate and elect significantly more women for legislative office, we transform our continuous measure of party ideology into a dichotomous variable that separates left from non-left parties. We code a party as left if its ideology score is equal to 8.6 or less on the 20-point scale.
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Difference of means tests indicate that left parties are not more likely than non-left parties to have a woman as party president or secretary (p ¼ 0.54 in a two-tailed t-test). However, left parties are more likely to mention gender equality in their party statutes (p ¼ 0.03). Voluntary quotas are also more common in left parties: 40 percent of all parties in our dataset have internal quotas, but they appear in about half of left parties compared with only onethird of other parties (p ¼ 0.06). These comparisons provide some indication that left parties are more concerned with women's inclusion than non-left parties, but the differences are substantively small. This pattern repeats when we compare left and non-left parties on women's nomination. There is no statistically significant difference between left and non-left parties in the average percent women nominated to senates. For lower houses, left parties nominate only a slightly larger percent of women than non-left parties (mean for left ¼ 29 percent, mean for non-left ¼ 25 percent, p ¼ 0.08).
However, this finding disappears once we account for the role that different quota regimes play. Latin American parties will find themselves operating in one of four possible quota regimes: no quotas, a party quota only, a quota law only, or a party quota and a quota law together. Variation should occur across these regimes: parties will vary in terms of how much they comply with or attempt to shirk quota laws, and they will vary in how well they implement internal quotas. Figure 1 shows the average percent women nominated by chamber, party ideology, and quota regime. We see that while the left nominates more women on average in nearly every case, the differences are not statistically significant. Further, in the absence of quotas, non-left parties nominate slightly more women on average for both chambers (though these differences are again not statistically significant).
While left parties do not appear any better than non-left parties at nominating women, they do elect more women to the lower house on average. Specifically, the left elects about 1.5 times as many women to lower houses when compared with non-left parties (mean for left ¼ 24 percent, mean for right ¼ 16 percent, p ¼ 0.001). Figure 2 plots the proportion of women elected to the lower house against party ideology. The negative slope of the regression line suggests that women's elections decrease as party ideology moves toward the extreme right. Parties at the extreme left elect around 25 percent women, whereas parties at the extreme right elect less than 15 percent women. Thus, moving from the far left to the far right produces a difference of more than 10 percentage points in women's lower house elections.
However, party ideology fails to remain statistically significant once we account for other factors. Party ideology alone cannot explain women's elections across different quota regimes (see Supplementary figure S1). As with nominations, left parties elect more women on average in nearly every quota regime. Yet the difference is only statistically significant in one scenario: in the absence of quotas, left parties elect to the lower house an average of 16 percent women and non-left parties elect an average of 9 percent women (p ¼ 0.001). Any differences between left and non-left parties in getting women into office are thus only meaningful in the complete absence of quotas. Further, as we show in our multivariate analysis, party ideology loses significance once we factor in parties' decision environments.
Explaining Women's Elections and Nominations across Decision Environments
Parties entering elections decide to promote women in response to factors beyond ideology and quotas. Thus, we consider whether additional aspects of the decision environment-including citizens' views on the economy, citizens' trust in parties, and the number of competitor parties-have gendered effects. Taking women's nomination and election as our dependent variables, we combine the GEPPAL indicators with additional measures that capture the broader strategic environments in which parties operate.
Building on previous research, we control for four institutional variables. We measure quota laws using the quota strength score presented earlier. We measure the percent of women in the outgoing legislature using data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), since women's nominations and elections are expected to increase as more women gain political experience. We also code each country's electoral system based on whether CLPR is used exclusively, since CLPR favors women's representation. Finally, we control for the size of each legislative chamber, since women's representation is expected to increase when more seats are available.
At the party level, we control for party ideology (using the continuous measure), our women-friendliness index, and two additional controls: whether the party held the presidency during the time of the election and the year the party was founded. On the one hand, we might expect newer parties to be more responsive to concerns about gender equality and have less entrenched patterns of male dominance (Del Campo 2005) . On the other hand, we might expect older parties to nominate more women because they have more established rules guiding candidate selection (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2016) . 8 We do not control for the presence of female presidents or female presidential candidates. During the elections in our dataset, there were two seated female presidents and eleven female presidential candidates (Reyes-Housholder and Thomas 2018) and thus we cannot distinguish whether any statistically significant effects are due to gender or other characteristics of these few individuals.
Finally, and most importantly, we measure the decision environment using five variables. First is the endurance of the pink tide, measured as the number of years that a left (pink) president has been in power relative to the election year.
9 Second, we measure citizen evaluations of the economy by calculating the percent of respondents who describe their country's economic situation as "bad" or "very bad" using data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). Third, we measure distrust in parties by tallying the percent of respondents who distrust parties (those reporting 1, 2, or 3 on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 equals no trust and 7 equals a lot of trust) using LAPOP data. Fourth, using Baker and Greene's data, we capture party system fragmentation by measuring the effective number of parties that competed in the previous election, based on the proportion of votes won by each party (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) . These four variables are measured at the national level. At the party level, we generate a measure of each party's expected change in seat share by subtracting the percent of seats won in the current election from the party's seat share in the previous election.
10 Positive (negative) values indicate that the party expects to gain (lose) seats. Clearly, parties do not know how many seats they will win when making nomination decisions; however, if parties are reasonably adept at predicting their electoral success, then this measure provides a useful proxy for whether a party expects to increase or decrease their seat share.
Below, we present results from eight multivariate regression models estimated using random-effects generalized least squares (GLS). Given the panel nature of the data, GLS provides more efficient estimates than standard ordinary least squares (OLS) because it accounts for potential autocorrelation among the residuals. 11 We cluster standard errors by country to account for unobserved country-level covariates and also include a dummy variable to control for the second observation of each party, since 59 of 168 parties in our sample appear twice. The dependent variables are the percent of women nominated and elected as a percent of the total number of candidates nominated and elected from each party, for the upper and lower houses of congress.
Explaining Women's Nominations Table 3 presents results from our models explaining the percent women nominated by each party to both chambers. To better demonstrate the effects of the decision environment variables, we provide a base model of only institutional and party-level factors followed by the full models. The base model for the lower house (Model 1) indicates that institutional and party-level factors contribute to explaining women's nominations. The strength of quota laws, women's lower house representation, CLPR, and party ideology are significant. The results suggest that moving one unit to the right on the ideology measure decreases women's nominations by 0.4 percentage points. Thus, comparing the far ends of the spectrum, extreme right parties (ideology score-¼ 20) nominate 8 percentage points fewer women than extreme left parties (ideology score ¼ 1). The base model for the senate (Model 3) indicates that only the strength of national quotas is significant in explaining women's nominations, but not party ideology. Quota laws result in around 4 percentage points more women nominated to senates. Notably, we see that parties' women-friendliness does not have a significant impact on women's nominations to either chamber.
However, after controlling for the decision environment, the results change for both the lower and upper chambers. First, the full models controlling for the decision environment have slightly more explanatory power than the base models, as the R 2 statistic increases from 0.64 to 0.70 for the lower house models and from 0.56 to 0.70 for the upper house models. Second, the effect sizes and statistical significance of important institutional and party-level variables change when comparing the base and full models. For the lower house, quota strength, percent women in the outgoing legislature, and CLPR remain statistically significant, but ideology is no longer significant once the decision environment is controlled for. Further, the effect of the quota appears much smaller after accounting for the decision environment. For the upper house, quota strength remains significant, while the percent women in the outgoing senate and CLPR both become positive and significant.
Most notably, results from the full models for both houses suggest that certain aspects of the decision environment are important in explaining women's nomination (and ultimately their election). Citizens' perceptions of the economy and distrust in parties affect parties' decisions to nominate women for lower and upper chambers. The results suggest that when large portions of the population perceive the country's economic situation as bad, parties nominate fewer women, providing support for Hypothesis 3. For example, parties in a Notes. Models estimated using generalized least squares (GLS) random-effects estimator. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. þp < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
country where 60% of the population perceives poor economic conditions are expected to nominate around 21 percentage points fewer women to the senate and 6 percentage points fewer women to the lower house, when compared with parties in a country where only 20 percent of the population has this outlook. We observe the opposite effect for trust in parties: women's nominations are predicted to increase when much of the population distrusts parties, providing support for Hypothesis 2. For example, parties operating in a country where 60 percent of the population distrusts parties are expected to nominate 22 percentage points more women to the senate and 10 percentage points more women to the lower house, compared with parties operating in a country where 20 percent of the population distrusts parties. Two additional aspects of the decision environment are important in explaining women's lower house nominations: the endurance of the pink tide and the effective number of parties that competed in the previous election. Contrary to our expectation in Hypothesis 1, results suggest that women's lower house nominations decrease as the number of years a left president is in power increases. For every additional year a pink tide president is in power, parties nominate 0.6 percentage points fewer women. Likewise-but consistent with Hypothesis 4-parties nominate fewer women to the lower house when the number of parties competing (and winning votes) in the previous election is high. For each one-unit increase in the effective number of parties, we observe a decrease of 0.8 percentage points in the percent of women nominated. Table 4 presents our models explaining the percent women elected to both chambers. We again present a base model for each chamber in order to show how the effects of institutional and party-level covariates change once we control for the decision environment. In addition, we control for the percent women nominated by each party in both the base and full models. Because we control for women's nominations, the effects of the other variables should be interpreted as the direct effect of each factor on women's election-that is, the results indicate each variable's effect above and beyond any effect these variables might have on women's nominations. For example, by controlling for women's nominations and quota strength in the same model, we know that any significant effects the quota has on women's elections is not due solely to the impact quotas have on women's nominations, but rather due to the quotas' direct effect on women's elections. Controlling for only party-level and institutional factors, the base model for the lower house (Model 5) suggests that the percent women nominated, presence of quota laws, and party ideology are significant in explaining the percent women elected to the lower house. These results are consistent with previous scholarship suggesting that left parties and quotas are among the Notes. Models estimated using generalized least squares (GLS) random-effects estimator. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. þp < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. strongest predictors of women's access to legislatures (Alles 2014; Jones, Alles, and Tchintian 2012; Schwindt-Bayer 2009 ). The base model for the upper house (Model 7) suggests that the percent women nominated, CLPR, and chamber size have positive effects on women's elections. Party ideology has no significant effect. As in the nomination models, we see again that the party's women-friendliness is surprisingly not significant in explaining women's elections to either chamber. After controlling for the decision environment, the results suggest that the percent women nominated and the strength of quotas remain significant in explaining women's lower house elections (Model 6). However, party ideology no longer matters for the lower house: there is no statistically significant difference in the percent women elected from left and non-left parties after controlling for parties' decision environments. For the senates (Model 8), the percent women nominated, CLPR, and chamber size remain statistically significant, as they were in the base model. However, one decision environment variable also explains women's upper house elections: the party's expected change in seat share. Results indicate that parties elect 0.15 percentage points more women to upper houses for every additional seat the party expects to win, providing additional support for Hypothesis 4. However, this effect is only marginally statistically significant (p < 0.1).
Explaining Women's Elections
It is important to note that while other aspects of the decision environment have no direct impact on women's elections to upper and lower houses, the decision environment can shape women's elections through women's nominations. The relationship between women's nominations and elections approaches a one-for-one relationship in the lower house. On average, every 1 percentage point increase in women nominated yields a 0.65 percentage point increase in women elected. Further, a bivariate regression indicates that women's nominations alone explain about 40 percent of the variance in women's elections to the lower house. Women's nominations also strongly predict women's elections to the senate. Here, women's nominations explain about 20 percent of the variance in women's election to senates, and-after controlling for institutional, party, and decision environment factors-estimates indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in women nominated results in a 0.45 percentage point increase in women elected. Given the importance of the decision environment in explaining women's nominations, and the importance of women's nominations in explaining women's elections, the decision environment can have important, though indirect, effects on women's elections.
Conclusion: Women's Representation, Party Ideology, and the Decision Environment
Left parties in Latin America and elsewhere are widely believed to incorporate and promote women more than right parties. Left parties, due to their focus on egalitarianism and their historic ties with women's organizations, should support women within their party organizations and promote more women to legislative office. Yet, in examining the pink tide era-a period where many Latin American countries turned to the left and thus where greater mobilization around matters of equality and inclusion should have proved auspicious for women's electoral fortunes-we find that left parties do not always increase women's political representation.
Political parties have been and remain male-dominated (Morgan and Hinojosa 2018) . Scholars have repeatedly signaled the universality of party leaders' resistance to relinquishing power to women (Bjarnegård 2013; Bjarnegård and Kenny 2016) . Our analysis underscores this general finding, highlighting that left parties-despite appearing more "women friendly" on dimensions such as adopting internal party quotas-do not systematically nominate and elect more women. Left presidents, including female left presidents, do not strengthen quota laws once in government more than non-left presidents. Left parties also do not systematically over-comply with quotas when selecting candidates. In other words, the left does not advance women's representation through internal party mechanisms or through the advancement of gender quotas. In multivariate models examining only party-level and institutional factors, ideology does predict women's nomination and election to the lower house (but not the upper house), but this effect disappears once we account for the broader decision environments that parties face.
Taken together, our results reveal the gendered effects of the decision environments in which parties operate. Quotas and political ideology certainly matter, but previous scholarship has overlooked how economic performance, public trust, and electoral competition shape parties' incentives to nominate women. Indeed, we find that the decision environment matters more than party ideology for explaining women's nomination (and therefore their election). When citizens view the economy unfavorably or when parties face many competitors, parties are less likely to nominate women. Parties are also less likely to nominate women the longer a left president is in office, perhaps indicating that any extra attention the pink tide brought to equality and inclusion did not endure over time. Parties do, however, nominate more women as citizens' distrust in parties increases. We also find some indication that women's election increases when parties expect to gain seats in the upper chamber. Our findings reveal that political parties consider many factors when deciding whether to field women candidates, and indicate that further academic work should examine how the decision environment influences women's political representation.
While our examination provides critical insights into parties' decisionmaking processes during the pink tide, questions remain regarding how parties of the left and the right promote women. As more women in Latin America compete for and win the presidency, scholars might explore how female presidents or female presidential candidates shape parties' internal practices, from their agendas to their candidate selection procedures. The end of the pink tide also marks significant changes to the decision environment. Latin America is now shifting to the center and the right, choosing presidents whose policy agendas constitute a marked departure from the previous era, including Jimmy Morales in Guatemala, Michel Temer in Brazil, and Mauricio Macri in Argentina. Researchers may soon have the opportunity to explore how the fall of the left affects women's electoral fortunes throughout the region.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at SOCPOL online. Union. 2. We refer to both lower chambers of bicameral congresses and unicameral legislatures as lower houses. 3. Gregory Schmidt's work (2009) challenges the conventional wisdom regarding the favorability of CLPR for women's representation. 4. Some observations are omitted from the analyses due to missing data on one or more variables. 5. We also lack a second observation for parties in the three countries that did not hold elections between the first and second GEPPAL waves.
Notes
6. The Baker and Greene data and technical notes are available at http:// spot.colorado.edu/$bakerab/elections.html. We filled in missing ideology scores using the party's ideology score in the closest election year with available data. 7. We set this threshold based on presidential ideology scores. We identified all leftist presidents in office during the pink tide (Table 1) and checked their ideology scores against the Baker and Greene dataset, confirming that all these presidents had a score of 8.6 or lower. We then used this cut-off point to code parties as left or non-left. 8. Candidate selection procedures will not necessarily be more institutionalized in older parties. 9. We count all left presidents as pink presidents, where left is based on the president's ideology score at the time of the election. 10. This measure is chamber-specific. Seat share data come from IPU's PARLINE. When the PARLINE data proved incomplete or presented coalitions rather than parties, we supplemented the data using available sources. For example, for Venezuela, we also used data from Ló pez Maya and Meléndez (2007) and Morgan (2018) . 11. Regression models estimated using panel data could result in correlation between the residuals since the data include repeated observations of the same units over time. Thus, the Gaussian assumption that the errors are uncorrelated-which is necessary for OLS to be the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE)-is violated. OLS is no longer efficient, so it is not the "best" estimator. GLS, like OLS, is a linear estimator; however, GLS transforms the data in a way that standardizes and "de-correlates" the residuals, making GLS the best linear unbiased estimator for our data.
